Author: Anne M.

 

A 2020 study from the Voting Rights Lab reported that 52% of respondents expect an election winner to be announced within three days of the election, and that results announced a week or more after the election would cause the majority of those polled to question the legitimacy of said results (Voting Rights Lab (2020); accessed from: Bergeron-Boutin et al., MIT Election Lab (2020)). In their search for a quick relaying of election results, the American people often turn to the mainstream media (e.g. CNN, CBS, ABC, FOX) and election night reporting which broadcasts results that are, as many politicians and members of the media are quick to tell you, are always unofficial projections and not necessarily representative of what the result will be after all of the votes are counted (Bipartisan Policy Center (2024)). While the media’s reporting of election results is not inherently misleading, issues can arise when those reported results are misunderstood as being more final and less unofficial than they really are; and these sorts of misunderstandings are not uncommon, with a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2020 revealing that only 44% of the Americans polled were fully aware that the media projects the winner of each state when “they [the media] feel confident based on vote returns and other information” as opposed to projecting the winner when state officials have certified the results or when a specified critical percentage of votes in that state have been counted (Mitchell et al., Pew Research Center (2020)).

 

If you are thinking: “hm, I feel like expectations for quick election results could interfere with co-existing expectations for these quickly reported results to be accurate”, you are right.

In fact, the contestation of the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000 – an election that Thomas Mann, former Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brooking Institution, a political research organization, described as an election that “no work of fiction could have possibly captured the extraordinary twists and turns [of]” (Thomas E. Mann, Brookings Institution (2001))– began, in many ways, with the overzealous and unverified reporting of Election Day results (David Folkenflik, National Public Radio Website (2020)).

 

 

Polls conducted in the lead up to the 2000 U.S. Presidential election indicated that the race would be exceptionally close, a side effect of many different factors: including the perceived differences in levels of charisma in the two major party candidates (the Vice President at the time, Al Gore, as the Democratic party’s candidate, and the then Governor of Texas George Bush as the Republican party’s candidate); the recent impeachment scandal in the Clinton administration and George W. Bush’s newly publicized DUI charges (Gary L. Gregg II, The University of Virginia Miller Center); and a general shift in both parties towards a less divisive and more moderate middle ground, which made it more likely that the division of votes in the 2000 election would sway away from the historical voting patterns of individual voters and state electorates. The confluence of these factors and more made it so the presidential race, in certain states, – Florida, for example, which would become the primary arena for the contestation of the election results – was exceptionally close and, therefore, more prone to being swayed by the miscounting of votes, issues with certain ballots, and the, albeit, small number of votes cast for third party candidates Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan (Gerald M. Pomper, Political Science Quarterly (2001)).

 

 

Given the inconclusive results from pre-election day polls, it did not come as a surprise that the phrase “too close to call” was a common refrain heard during Election Day (Tuesday November 7th, 2000) broadcasts across the major news networks. But around 8 PM, the major networks, based on information from the Voters News Service (VNS) which was itself based on exit polls at polling places, reported a critical number of electoral votes (25) for Al Gore (Democrat) from the then un-declared state of Florida–-suggesting that a decisive conclusion to these indecisive election results was in sight. However, at around 9:31, members of George Bush’s (Republican) campaign, believing that the remaining votes that were still to be counted in Florida would cause the state to “flip” and be declared for Bush instead of Gore, implored Bush to publicly dispute the 8:00 PM declaration of Florida for Gore. Ostensibly in response to the claims made by Bush and his campaign, the networks that had originally called Florida for Al Gore retracted their previous statements and re-declared Florida as being “too close to call”. At around 2:30 AM on Wednesday November 8th, 2000, after receiving results from other states as well as updated results based on the 96% of votes that had been counted in Florida, the major networks declared the state of Florida and, with it, the Presidential Election for George Bush. Believing that the media reports were true, Al Gore almost immediately called Bush to concede and congratulate him on his win–a “sportsmanlike” move that, after being reported by the media the next day, proved to have important impacts on many people’s perceptions of the election results and the legitimacy of the later contestation of them. As Gore was on his way to publicly concede, more votes from Florida were counted, which diminished George Bush’s lead in the state by a critical margin, pushed the Florida results into the realm of uncertainty, and paved the way for contestation of the final election results (CNN “Bush v. Gore: ‘Too Close to Call'”, (2015); Chronology: November 7th- December 18th 2001 from “Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary on JSTOR” (2001), E.J Dionne and William Kristol  ).

 

In the aftermath of these confusing, shifting, and indecisive media reports in the early hours of November 8th, the United States witnessed an unprecedented, contested election with great historical significance. While the media obviously had no direct role in deciding the final results of the election– which ended up being the product of a highly controversial Supreme Court Decision in which Gore’s requested recount of votes in Florida was halted, allowing George Bush to officially be declared as the winner of the 2000 Presidential Election (“Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary on JSTOR” (2001), E.J Dionne and William Kristol )— the confusion caused by their premature, unofficial declaration that Bush had won the election influenced many people’s perceptions of Al Gore, as it caused them to believe that Gore’s calls for a recounting of votes in Florida were the illegitimate attempts of a “sore-loser” to challenge Bush’s legitimate election win; a perception which, as proven by the willingness of the Florida State Legislature to recount votes as well as beliefs about the “true” results of the election held by both Republican and Democrat politicians involved in the election (CNN “Bush v. Gore: ‘Too Close to Call'”, (2015)), is largely if not wholly inaccurate (U.S. Congressional Hearing: Election Night Coverage By The Networks in 2000 (2001)).

 

Since the 2000 Election, the mainstream media has taken considerable action to prevent what happened on November 7th and 8th (2000) from happening again (U.S. Congressional Hearing: Election Night Coverage By The Networks in 2000 (2001)), but the race to be the first network to call the election continues to influence how these major news networks go about their Election Night Reporting (Daniel Okrent, The Brennan Center (2020)). While there are many, arguably more important, lessons to be learned from the 2000 Presidential Election that extend far beyond issues involving media coverage and how election results are reported (i.e. regarding the popular vote vs. the electoral college vote; voter disenfranchisement; discriminatory voting practices; and the scope of the Supreme Court’s power), it is important to, as we approach the 2024 Election, be reminded of the true unofficial nature of, what is, for many, the first election results that they hear.

 

 

 

 

Sources

 

(in order of first appearance)

 

Voting Rights Lab (2020)

 

 

Bergeron-Boutin et al., MIT Election Lab (2020)

 

 

Bipartisan Policy Center (2024)

 

 

Mitchell et al., Pew Research Center (2020)

 

 

Thomas E. Mann, Brookings Institution (2001)

 

 

David Folkenflik, National Public Radio Website (2020)

 

 

Gary L. Gregg II, The University of Virginia Miller Center

 

 

Gerald M. Pomper, Political Science Quarterly (2001)

 

 

CNN “Bush v. Gore: ‘Too Close to Call'”, (2015)

 

Chronology: November 7th- December 18th 2001 from “Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary on JSTOR” (2001), E.J Dionne and William Kristol  

 

U.S. Congressional Hearing: Election Night Coverage By The Networks in 2000 (2001)

 

 

Daniel Okrent, The Brennan Center (2020)

In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (Shelby County v. Holder) that key elements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 – an act that put an end to many of the forms of voter suppression that had been used to effectively disenfranchise  voters of color since the era of post-Civil War Reconstruction (1865-1876) – were unconstitutional; namely, Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights act which provided guidelines to determine which jurisdictions were subject to Section 5 of the Act, which stated that jurisdictions with a history of voter discrimination must gain approval from the U.S. Attorney General or a federal court before making changes to any elements of election procedures and/or practices. In deeming Section 4(b) of the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court essentially nullified Section 5 of the act, by releasing all jurisdictions previously monitored under Section 4(b) from federal oversight, thus allowing these jurisdictions with histories of voter discrimination to enact new voting laws and procedures without the previously required federal approval (U.S Office of Public Affairs, “Reflecting On the 10th Anniversary of Shelby County v. Holder”, 2023). While acts, such as the Voting Rights Advancement Act (HR4), have been proposed to patch the holes that the Supreme Court’s Shelby County decision created in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, none of these rehabilitory acts have been instated, allowing discriminatory voting laws and procedures to continue suppressing voters of color.

 

The suppression of Black Americans’ right to vote is a modern issue with a very long and violent history. After the passing of the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S Constitution in 1870, which guaranteed the right to vote to all citizens regardless of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude” (The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution  ), many white Southerners – particularly former Confederate Civil War soldiers – attempted to take matters into their own hands; which, through their violent attempts to gain control over the changing election landscape and suppress Black voters, would become and continue to be stained with the blood of Black Americans (Michael W. Fitzgerald and Mark Bohnhorst, “Reconstruction, Racial Terror, and the Electoral College” (2024), The Journal of the Civil War (Vol. 14, 1)).

 

In the U.S. presidential Election of 1876, rampant voter suppression and the resulting contestation of election results paved the path towards the destruction of Reconstruction era amendments and the prolonging of the country’s historic trampling of Black Americans’ civil rights. Contestation of the 1876 election began on election day and continued right up until the inauguration, as no winner could be determined due to conflicting results from two separate groups of electors in Columbia, South Carolina; Salem, Oregon; Tallahassee, Florida; and New Orleans, Louisiana — leaving Congress with 184 electoral votes for Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden, and 165 electoral votes for Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes, with 20 votes still being disputed. These conflicting results, and arguments between the two parties as to whether the House of Representatives or Congress should be in charge of deciding the election, led to the creation of a (mostly) bipartisan Electoral Commission. This Electoral Commission would end up awarding the electoral votes from the states in question (OR, SC, FL, and LA) to Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. This decision was informed by, though not directly stated as the result of, the fact that the initial results from a number of districts in these states, which had reported a majority of their electoral votes for the Democratic candidate Tilden, were invalidated by the rampant fraud, intimidation, and racial violence committed during and ahead of election day by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the name of white supremacist ideals and in pursuit of a Democratic party victory (Sheila Blackford, “Disputed Election of 1876”, The University of Virginia Miller Center). In other words, this Electoral Commission recognized that, as Michael W. Fitzgerald and Mark Bohnhorst argued in an article published in The Journal of the Civil War, “terrorist violence could manufacture Democratic majorities”, making many of the electoral votes for Tilden either effectively or literally (in the case of illegitimately selected “fake” electors) fraudulent (Michael W. Fitzgerald and Mark Bohnhorst, “Reconstruction, Racial Terror, and the Electoral College” (2024), The Journal of the Civil War (Vol. 14, 1)).

Despite both Democratic and Republican parties agreeing that the Electoral Commission would decide the Election of 1876, the results of the Commission’s decision faced backlash, with Democratic members of congress threatening a slew of measures to delay the resolution of the election in an effort to gain concessions from Republicans; namely, a federal railroad subsidy as well as more control over their state governments, which would, in turn, allow them to enact more racist laws and policies in an effort to further their white supremacist agendas (Sheila Blackford, “Disputed Election of 1876”, The University of Virginia Miller Center). The prospect of further delays scared many Republicans, including the apparent presidential elect Rutherford B. Hayes, as they feared what a prolonged contestation of the election would mean for the perceived legitimacy of the election results. In an effort to ward off these delays and appease Democratic politicians, Hayes made a compromise of unknown terms (known as the Compromise of 1877) with Southern politicians, which, as Michael A. Ross describes in his book The Presidents and the Constitution: A Living History, boiled down to Hayes pledging to, in exchange for the presidency, “pursue a policy of noninterference in Southern affairs”, remove troops from Southern states and, in removing these troops, allow Democrats to take control of any remaining Republican governments in Southern states (Chapter 19 of The Presidents and the Constitution: A Living History (2016) by Michael A. Ross). In making this compromise with Democratic leaders, Hayes ushered in the end of Reconstruction and set the stage for another century of extreme racial violence and many forms of discrimination – including, but certainly not limited to, voter suppression – in the American South.

 

While we as a country have certainly made progress towards ensuring that, in the words of Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution:

 

“the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”

 

we still have quite a ways to go, as evidenced by the continued passage of restrictive and discriminatory voting legislation in states with histories of voter suppression (The Brennan Center for Justice, “States Have Added Nearly 100 Restrictive Laws Since SCOTUS Gutted the Voter’s Rights Act Ten Years Ago” (2023)). This continued fight for equal voters’ rights makes discussing the history of voter suppression, as well as raising awareness for modern instances of discriminatory voting rules and procedures, incredibly important; especially today, post-Shelby County decision, and ahead of what is likely to be a very pivotal election which – in the eyes of LaTosha Brown, the co-founder of the Black Voters Matter organization – carries a high risk for instances of voter suppression as well as the proliferation of targeted misinformation and falsehoods among populations of Black voters, which can prove to be a covert but still dangerous form of election tampering (National Public Radio, “Disinformation and suppression loom over Georgia, says Black Votes Matter co-founder” (2024)).

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

(in order of first appearance)

 

U.S Office of Public Affairs, “Reflecting On the 10th Anniversary of Shelby County v. Holder”, 2023

 

The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution  

 

Michael W. Fitzgerald and Mark Bohnhorst, “Reconstruction, Racial Terror, and the Electoral College” (2024), The Journal of the Civil War (Vol. 14, 1)

 

Sheila Blackford, “Disputed Election of 1876”, The University of Virginia Miller Center

 

Chapter 19 of The Presidents and the Constitution: A Living History (2016) by Michael A. Ross

 

The Brennan Center for Justice, “States Have Added Nearly 100 Restrictive Laws Since SCOTUS Gutted the Voter’s Rights Act Ten Years Ago” (2023)

 

National Public Radio, “Disinformation and suppression loom over Georgia, says Black Votes Matter co-founder” (2024)

In Presidential elections, candidates often advertise their policies as being based around the beliefs and desires of their supporters and are seen as representatives of the political party they belong to. While a given political party (e.g., “Party A”) often focuses on how the Presidential candidate chosen from Party A represents their supporters, political parties which stand in opposition to Party A (e.g., “Party B”) will often focus their “attacks” against Party A around what they believe the actions and beliefs held by the demographic of Party A’s supporters say about the “true” goals and ideals of Party A’s presidential candidate. Here is a recent example, which will hopefully make the previous sentence a little clearer:

 

Ahead of the 2020 Presidential election, The New York Times published an article discussing then incumbent Republican candidate Donald Trump’s allegations that the Democratic candidate, Joe Biden, held ties to “radical left” groups such as Antifa (Anti-fascists). The article went on to juxtapose the beliefs held by these “radical left” groups that Trump had associated with Biden with the actual policies, stances, and statements that the Biden/Harris campaign had provided on those beliefs. For example, one of the primary movements led by Antifa and similar groups is the movement to defund the police, a movement which Joe Biden opposes, with him evening stating that his plan for successful Police reform would require more funding to be put in to Police departments (“Biden Walks a Cautious Line as He Opposes Defunding the Police” (June 8th 2020), The New York Times,).

 

These kinds of confusing representations of Presidential candidates (often made by the candidate’s opposition) as being advocates for the more “radical” parts of the political party they represent, despite the candidates themselves having expressed opposition to beliefs and policies held by those “radical” parts, is nothing new; and, as you may have guessed, these sorts of misattributions of “radical” views to Presidential candidates can have rather severe consequences. One of the most significant examples of this sort of phenomenon can be seen in what was, arguably, the most significant election in the history of the United States of America: the election of 1860.

 

 

 

The Presidential election of 1860 was exceptionally regional, with essentially two different presidential races occurring in the Northern and Southern United States. Presidential candidates were chosen by the Republican party as well as both parties that emerged from the newly fractured Democratic party: representing the Republican party, Abraham Lincoln of Illinois; representing the Northern Democrats, Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas; and representing the Southern Democrats, incumbent Vice President John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. Despite not being included on the ballot in any of the Southern states, Lincoln earned 180 electoral votes, with the runner-up, Breckinridge, having earned only 72 votes (The Miller Center, “Abraham Lincoln: Campaigns and Elections”, Michael Burlingame).

 

In his first inauguration address, Lincoln attempted to reassure an ever-anxious American South that the Federal Government, believed by many Southerners to be representing the interests of Northern states exclusively, would not bring about “bloodshed or violence” in any conflict with Southern states unless such extreme actions were “forced upon the national authority”, and that he had no intentions nor right to “interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists”. However, Lincoln made it clear To ensure that there could be no misinterpretation of what sorts of events would cause a violent approach to be “forced upon the national authority”, and cleverly clarify his position on whether secession was truly possible under the constitution, Lincoln asserted his intentions to “[use] the power confided in [him as president] to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government” in the case of any attempts by any group to annex any such property or places, as the Confederate States of America, would go on to do a little over a month after this inauguration address, leading to the beginning of the Civil War (First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln (March 4th 1861),  Yale Law School: The Avalon Project)

 

While Abraham Lincoln has long been known by many as the “Great Emancipator”, his first presidential campaign was notably not based in abolitionist ideals; that is, not interested in actively dismantling the institution of slavery. He was so far removed from the abolitionist movement in 1860, that famed abolitionist and Civil Rights leader, Frederick Douglass, in an 1876 memorial address labeled Lincoln as “preeminently the white man’s President, entirely devoted to the welfare of white men” (An Oration in Memory of Abraham Lincoln (April 14th 1876), Frederick Douglass.). The Republican campaign for Lincoln’s presidency even went so far as to eagerly deny claims that their party subscribed to abolitionist ideals, publicly denounce abolitionist politicians who voiced their support for Lincoln, and attempt to frame the Democratic party as the party committed to threatening “white supremacy” due to their desire to expand the institution of slavery to new states which would therefore increasing the population of non-white enslaved peoples. Why, then, were Southerners seemingly so afraid of Abraham Lincoln’s Presidency that seven states had seceded by February 1st, 1961, remarkably soon after Lincoln’s election on November 6th, 1860 (Britannica, United States History: Secession)?

 

It can be difficult to find clarity as to why these Southern States felt such urgency, even if looking towards documents such as the Declaration of Secession of South Carolina, the first state to secede: which makes it clear that Lincoln’s presidency is a, if not the, primary cause for their secession, stating that in electing Lincoln, the Northern states have elected a man whose “opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery” and who has declared that “the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction”(South Carolina Declaration of Secession (1860), from the Constitution Center).

 

At this point, it is important to note that Southern States were not just afraid of abolitionists, but also afraid of anti-slavery politicians who, in refusing to enact slave codes which would protect Southerner’s rights to own slaves in the Constitution, could eventually bring about the abolition of slavery. While Lincoln did not belong to any abolitionist party, he was firmly anti-slavery, thus igniting the fears of Southerners. For example, Lincoln and the Republican party were very firmly opposed to implementing the institution of slavery in then unestablished states and territories. No matter the validity of some Southerners’ belief that Lincoln wanted to abolish slavery nationwide, there was basis for their fear that Lincoln’s presidency would mark the end of the expansion of slavery and, as a result, the addition of more “free states” which could diminish the power slave states held in decisions made by the Federal Government (i.e. fewer slave states relative to the number of free states means lower percentage of representation in the federal government for slave states) (Sally Heinzel, “‘To Protect the Rights of the White Race’: Illinois Republican Racial Politics in the 1860 Campaign and the Twenty-Second General Assembly”, Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society (Vol. 108, No. 3-4, Fall/Winter 2015) ). However, Lincoln’s anti-slavery ideals do not necessarily justify the urgency with which the Southern States responded to his election by seceding, as Lincoln made it clear that he had no intentions of actively pursuing the abolishing of slavery, let alone attempting to abolish slavery in Southern States through violent or forceful means (Adam I.P Smith, “Chapter 3 Beyond the Realignment Synthesis: The Election of 1860 Reconsidered”, America at the Ballot Box: Elections and Political History (2015)) .

 

 

To fully understand these States’ extreme responses to Lincoln’s presidency, it can be helpful to look at some of the movements, groups, and events with which Democrats, however incorrectly, aligned Lincoln and the “mainstream” Republican: for example, the Wide Awake movement.

The Wide Awake movement was a militia-inspired movement which reflected the publics’ interest in militarism and aligned itself with Republican ideals. The members of the movement were mostly young men from non-aristocratic backgrounds. Though criticized by many politicians for their lack of political experience, the Wide Awakes remained very active and politically engaged, reflecting the growing interest of younger generations in U.S politics. While not inherently violent, the Wide Awakes were, as previously mentioned, sort of military “themed”. While the Wide-Awake movement began their activist efforts relatively tamely, focusing on safely escorting Republican candidates through the predominantly Democratic city of Hartford, Connecticut, they quickly changed course. The Wide Awakes organized marches in the late hours of the evening, disturbing the peace of the places in which they marched, and focused their efforts on battleground states and regions, where Democrats and Republicans held equal or mostly equal footing in terms of numbers of supporters. While not inherently violent, the militia-like organization of the Wide Awakes brought about discomfort and fear in many Southerners who feared that the Wide Awakes were a sort of dormant Northern army that could invade Southern states and/or become violent towards Southerners at any point. As historian Jon Grinspan argued in his article about the Wide Awakes, “Young Men for War, published in The Journal of American History, many Southerners viewed the Wide Awakes’ actions as “confirmation of their fears of northern coercion”, demonstrating that the actions of groups that aligned themselves with the Republican party were interpreted as somehow representative of the party’s true aims and goals and, further, that the story of the Wide Awakes “shows that campaign metaphors are not empty hoopla, but rather display the intimate relationship between citizens and their politics” (Jon Grinspan, “‘Young Men of War’: The Wide Awakes and Lincoln’s 1860 Presidential Campaign” (2009), The Journal of American History (Vol. 6, No.2)). In other words, despite no clear indication from Lincoln that he, representing the Northern states, planned to invade and commit violent acts in Southern states, the militaristic actions of Republican party supporters (the Wide Awakes) “spoke louder” than Lincoln’s words (or, perhaps, his silence), bringing about fears of “Northern Aggression” in Southern States which may have contributed to States’ decisions to secede after Lincoln’s election.

 

The story of the Wide Awakes and their role in convincing some Southerners, despite Lincoln’s lack of expressed intent to take any direct action to abolish slavery or interfere with slave states, that the Federal Government under President Abraham Lincoln would become increasingly aggressive and violent in their quest to abolish slavery and strip Southern states of their autonomy can teach us some important lessons about the dangers that accompany the use of fear-mongering and exaggerated radicalism as a sort of campaign tool used by opposing political candidates. While very different in terms of degree of consequence and conspiracy, the gap between the ideological panic that leads to baseless warnings like that which was seen in the January 9th edition of the Jackson Weekly Mississippian:

 

“Large bodies of Wide Awakes have been organized with a view to attempt the invasion of South Carolina under the sanction of the Federal flag” (Jon Grinspan, “‘Young Men of War’: The Wide Awakes and Lincoln’s 1860 Presidential Campaign” (2009), The Journal of American History (Vol. 6, No.2)).

 

And the sort of false rhetoric seen in Donald Trumps’ unfounded allegations of Biden’s alignment with organizations like Antifa, which would no doubt cause extreme alarm in Republican supporters and moderate Democrats, is one which we should be very careful to not bridge.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

(In order of first appearance)

 

 

 

“Biden Walks a Cautious Line as He Opposes Defunding the Police” (June 8th 2020), The New York Times,

 

The Miller Center, “Abraham Lincoln: Campaigns and Elections”, Michael Burlingame

 

 

First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln (March 4th, 1861), Yale Law School: The Avalon Project

 

 

An Oration in Memory of Abraham Lincoln (April 14th 1876), Frederick Douglass.

 

 

Britannica, United States History: Secession

 

 

South Carolina Declaration of Secession (1860), from the Constitution Center

 

 

Sally Heinzel, “‘To Protect the Rights of the White Race’: Illinois Republican Racial Politics in the 1860 Campaign and the Twenty-Second General Assembly”, Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society (Vol. 108, No. 3-4, Fall/Winter 2015)

 

 

Adam I.P Smith, “Chapter 3 Beyond the Realignment Synthesis: The Election of 1860 Reconsidered”, America at the Ballot Box: Elections and Political History (2015)

 

 

Jon Grinspan, “‘Young Men of War’: The Wide Awakes and Lincoln’s 1860 Presidential Campaign” (2009), The Journal of American History (Vol. 6, No.2)

 

 

 

 

Research published in 2022 by the Pew Research Center has shown that many Americans today are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the current political system and, particularly, what many perceive as a rise in partisan politics (Pew Research Center Report Regarding Rising Partisan Hostility in the U.S.). While it may not be reassuring, it can be comforting to know that the U.S. political system is not only no stranger to alleged corruption and extreme polarization, but has been able to operate under these stressors from as early as 1800 (John J. Turner, “The Twelfth Amendment and the First American Party System” (1973)). There are perhaps no better sources with which to demonstrate the constancy of these stressors in U.S. politics than first-hand accounts of the state of the nation during and in the aftermath of two notoriously contentious elections which occurred early in the nation’s history: the elections of 1800 and 1824.

From the Election of 1800: Letter from Charles Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson (February 9th, 1801), National Founders Archive

In a letter from South Carolinian Democratic Republican Charles Pinckney (not to be confused with his cousin Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a member of the opposing Federalist political faction) to then presidential candidate, Thomas Jefferson, speaks to the state of the US political system during the contentious election of 1800 (Letter from Charles Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson (February 9th, 1801), National Founders Archive). The letter was written on February 9^th, 1801, just ahead of a vote in the House of Representatives which would break the tie between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams in the votes of the electoral college and decide the election. While the political party system had not yet been implemented, the lines of division and lack of trust that people recognize between major US political parties today were certainly present. Democratic Republicans, believing that “big-government” Federalist policies were too similar to those seen in a monarchy system, did not trust Federalists to protect the nation, while Federalists believed that the high levels of state independence, lack of national bank, and expressed intention to support France in their brewing conflict with the British (characteristic of a Democratic Republican political approach) would eventually lead to a dissolution of the union. This letter reveals glimmers of those conflicts, with Pinckney expressing his extreme concern with the possibility of a Federalist “trick” leading to the reelection of Federalist incumbent John Adams rather than Jefferson, a leading Democratic Republican.  In this letter, Pinckney, who had just arrived in New York on his way to Washington, states that the severity of his anxiety has inspired him to “risk” his injured arm in order to “be on with [Jefferson] as quick as possible”.

Pinckney closes out the letter by informing Jefferson of his plans to be with him in Washington by the next week and voicing his hope that the “Voice of [the] country” will be heard and that, because of the country’s voice being heard, its wishes to see Jefferson as President will come to fruition. This closing statement further reflects his strong belief that to elect Jefferson as president was, not only the best choice for the future of the United States, but also that Jefferson was the candidate that the nation itself preferred, despite the fact that the will of much of the nation was notably not directly represented in the voting that occurred in both the electoral college and the House of Representatives (Jack N. Rakove, “Presidential Selection: Electoral Fallacies”, Published in Volume 119, Issue 1 of Political Science Quarterly (2004)).

Pinckney’s sense of duty and urgency is indicative of just how dire politicians from both factions believed the election of 1800 to be. In his short letter to Jefferson, Pinckney encapsulates the magnitude of the election of 1800 in the eyes of Americans at the time as well as the severe fracturing between Democratic Republicans and Federalists at the core of the first contentious presidential election in US history.

From the election of 1824: Letter from Andrew Jackson to William Berkeley Lewis (February 14, 1825), Library of Congress

The election of 1824 marked the end of an era in the History of the United States known as the “Era of Good Feelings” (1815-1825). During this era, American citizens were finally able to turn their attention away from European affairs and pay it, in full, to what was happening in their home country – a country which, in 1820, at least appeared to be a nation united under one political party: the Democratic Republicans (Britannica, “Era of Good Feelings”). The Democratic Republican party’s dominance in 1820 was, in many ways, the result of long-term effects stemming from the presidential election of 1800: a bitter battle between the two dominant political groups at the time, the Federalists and Democratic Republicans, which ended in Thomas Jefferson’s presidency (Democratic Republican). The election of 1800 also spurred the formation and ratification of the 12th amendment which facilitated what we know as “party politics”, by allowing the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates from the same party to essentially run as a “package-deal”, and set guidelines for protocols in the event that no candidate received a critical majority of the votes in the electoral college (John J. Turner, “The Twelfth Amendment and the First American Party System” (1973)). When the state delegates in the electoral college cast their votes in the election of 1824, they were faced with a choice between five different members who were all, at least nominally, members of the Democratic Republican party: William H. Crawford of Georgia, Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, Henry Clay of Kentucky, and John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts (Statistics from the Election of 1824, “The American Presidency Project”, Published by the University of California at Santa Barbara).

While Jackson won the popular vote of the American people as well as the most electoral votes of the five men, with Quincy Adams having the second most popular and electoral votes, he did not win the 131 electoral votes necessary to win the election (Chapter 6: “The Corrupt Bargain” from William Nester’s The Age of Jackson and the Art of American Power 1815-1848 (Copyright 2013)). So, as was established with the ratification of the 12th amendment in the aftermath of the contested election of 1800, the election was thrown to the House of Representatives through which each state delegation would be able to vote (John J. Turner, “The Twelfth Amendment and the First American Party System” (1973)). While the 12th amendment allowed for the top three candidates with the most electoral votes to be included in the tie-breaking vote, Henry Clay, the candidate with the third most electoral votes, decided to drop out of the election in order to use his influence as Speaker of the House to bolster John Quincy Adams’ chances of defeating Andrew Jackson.

Despite all being members of the same party, a few of the five men had serious misgivings about some of their opponents’ character and ability to successfully lead a nation. Much of these misgivings were either directed towards or held by General Andrew Jackson, a divisive figure known primarily for his military prowess. Perhaps most notable among Andrew Jackson’s conflicts with political adversaries was the shared animosity between him and Henry Clay. This animosity reached a fever-pitch of sorts when, after being endorsed by Clay as Speaker of the House, John Quincy Adams won the tie-breaking vote in the House of Representatives and, consequently, the presidency despite having received less electoral and popular votes than Jackson. However, it was not Clay’s endorsement of John Quincy Adams alone that inspired great anger among Andrew Jackson and his supporters, but rather Quincy Adams’ later appointment of Clay to the office of the Secretary of State. Jackson and his supporters, understandably, did not view Clay’s appointment following his endorsement of John Quincy Adams to be a coincidence, but rather an instance of political malfeasance which would go on to be known as the “Corrupt Bargain” (Chapter 6: “The Corrupt Bargain” from William Nester’s The Age of Jackson and the Art of American Power 1815-1848 (Copyright 2013)). In a letter to his friend and advisor Major William Berkeley Lewis, Jackson pondered if not only the nation, but the world, “[had] ever witnessed such a bare faced corruption” before Clay and John Quincy Adams’ alleged, and still unsubstantiated, “Corrupt Bargain”. Earlier in that same letter to Major Lewis, Jackson described Clay as “the Judas of the West”, emphasizing the extreme nature of the betrayal he believed to have occurred  (Letter from Andrew Jackson to William Berkeley Lewis (February 14, 1825), Library of Congress).

With the intense political climate of the present-day United States, and the fears and uncertainty that this climate can inspire, it can be hard to fathom that the United States has endured, and could continue to endure, the kinds of partisanship and animosity we currently see between political parties and politicians. However, a brief look into the history of U.S. politics can show us that the nation has endured many perilous events that, arguably, posed a greater threat to our democratic system than any trials and tribulations we have seen in the past two decades. While the perspective one can gain from learning about these past events may not bring peace of mind, or some form of guidance with which to navigate issues in the present-day, it can hopefully provide some semblance of assurance that our democracy has the ability to survive in and adapt to the increasingly rocky landscape that is U.S. politics.

Sources

In order of first appearance:

1. Pew Research Center Report Regarding Rising Partisan Hostility in the U.S.
2. John J. Turner, “The Twelfth Amendment and the First American Party System” (1973)
3. Letter from Charles Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson (February 9th, 1801), National Founders Archive
4. Jack N. Rakove, “Presidential Selection: Electoral Fallacies”, Published in Volume 119, Issue 1 of Political Science Quarterly (2004)
5. Letter from Andrew Jackson to William Berkeley Lewis (February 14, 1825), Library of Congress
6. Britannica, “Era of Good Feelings”
7. Statistics from the Election of 1824, “The American Presidency Project”, Published by the University of California at Santa Barbara
8. Chapter 6: “The Corrupt Bargain” from William Nester’s The Age of Jackson and the Art of American Power 1815-1848 (Copyright 2013)